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China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 as an economy which was under-
going transformation and did not yet have market economy status (MES). This enabled other 
WTO members, including the European Union, to be more flexible in imposing anti-dumping 
tariffs on Chinese exporters. China’s accession protocol provides for the elimination of one 
of the anti-dumping procedures after 15 years, i.e. in December 2016. The upcoming changes 
have fuelled a dispute in Europe regarding the interpretation of the conditions of China’s ac-
cession to the WTO and the future of trade relations between the EU and China.
For years, Beijing has opted for ‘hard automatism’. In their official statements, Chinese leaders 
have pointed to the fact that the EU “needs to fulfil its promises” and emphasised the commit-
ment to grant China market economy status, which they say was contained in the accession 
protocol. China has reacted negatively to the European Commission’s stance (announced in 
July 2016) which provides for a comprehensive reconstruction of the procedures for imposing 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy tariffs. The European Commission’s activities were interpreted 
as a tactical dodge and an attempt to refuse to take the Chinese position into account. The 
announced change in the methodology of imposing tariffs was seen as a tool to maintain 
the status quo and as continued action to discriminate against Chinese producers on the EU 
market. Further actions by China depend on how quickly the changes announced by the Com-
mission are to be implemented. If these are not approved by the European Parliament and 
the member states by December 2016, and the EU continues to apply the present regulations, 
China will likely take legal action at the WTO. At the same time, Beijing will try to influence 
the final shape of the new procedure for imposing anti-dumping tariffs by taking advantage 
of its contacts with EU institutions and specific member states. 
The legal dispute: what does China’s 
WTO accession protocol provide for? 
When the conditions of China’s accession to 
the WTO were being negotiated, China – as an 
economy undergoing transformation – was cov-
ered by modified rules for imposing anti-dump-
ing tariffs for a period of 15 years. Article 15a 
of China’s WTO accession protocol signed in 
2001 provides for two types of procedure for 
setting the so-called normal price, which is the 
basis for calculating the scale of dumping. Ac-
cording to the first type, prices used at the Chi-
nese domestic market are considered the nor-
mal price, provided that the specific Chinese 
producer is able to prove that market econo-
my conditions prevail in their industry. In this 
way, anti-dumping proceedings focused on 
a specific company are de facto carried out accord-
ing to principles applicable to economies which 
have been granted MES. According to the second 
type, the importer may use the methodology in-
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volving comparing the prices offered with pric-
es used in third-country markets; this is possible 
when the producer is unable to prove that mar-
ket economy conditions prevail in their industry. 
Article 15d of the accession protocol states that on 
11 December 2016 the second type of proce-
dure, involving comparison with third coun-
tries, is to be automatically and unconditional-
ly revoked. However, Article 15d does not refer 
directly to the issue of granting market econo-
my status on that day. This is to be done when 
a specific WTO member state establishes that 
China meets its definition of a market economy1. 
If MES is granted, Article 15a will cease to apply, 
the special treatment of China will be discontin-
ued, and China’s position will become equal to 
that of the remaining WTO members.   
The potential automatism in granting China 
market economy status, associated with the 
provisions of Article 15d, has become a bone 
of contention among the participants in the 
debate. According to some lawyers, no com-
mitment to treat Chinese entrepreneurs after 
December 2016 as equal partners, similar to 
entities from any market economy, has been 
formulated. The only effect of the expiration 
of the disputed provision would involve offer-
ing the importing country an opportunity to 
freely choose one of the methodologies: ei-
ther the domestic price methodology or the 
methodology of third-country prices, in case 
Chinese producers fail to prove that market 
economy conditions prevail in their industry. 
1 In light of the definitions adopted by the European 
Union during the recent verification procedure carried 
out in 2011, China failed to meet four out of the five 
main EU’s criteria of a market economy.
On the other hand, supporters of automatism 
point to the fact that even if Article 15d does 
not contain any commitment to grant MES to 
China de iure in December 2016, it fully revokes 
the procedure based on methodologies applied 
to non-market economies. As a consequence, 
the importing country can only take advantage 
of the methodology based on Chinese prices, 
which in turn would be tantamount to de facto 
granting MES to China regardless of whether 
it meets the criterion of a market economy as 
defined according to local standards.
The economic consequences of granting 
MES to China 
If the provisions of China’s WTO accession 
protocol were implemented in line with Chi-
na’s expectations, this would be tantamount 
to abandoning the main tool used to protect 
European producers operating in those in-
dustries which are unable to compete with 
Chinese producers due to the Chinese state’s 
control of the prices of land, capital and en-
ergy. The main argument put forward by Eu-
ropean opponents of granting MES to China 
involves the potential weakening of the com-
petitiveness of producers from EU countries 
resulting from the potential lowering of prices 
of Chinese goods, which in turn would raise 
the unemployment rate. The level of damage 
depends on the economic models used to 
prepare the forecasts, and on the estimates 
regarding those industry sectors which are 
potentially at risk. Due to major difficulties 
in forecasting the structural changes to trade 
which would result from the fact of granting 
MES to China, the adopted assumptions and 
the final calculations frequently depend on 
the views of the institution which prepares 
them. Figures quoted by industry associa-
tions, trade unions and states which oppose 
the plan to grant MES to China are usually 
several times higher than the figures provided 
by the European Commission. 
The dispute over the interpretation of the 
provisions of China’s WTO accession pro-
tocol concerns the legal basis for the EU’s 
customs policy towards China.
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According to the report by the Economic Pol-
icy Institute (EPI), an organisation associated 
with American trade unions, which has most 
frequently been quoted by the media and in 
parliamentary debates, the granting of MES 
to China could directly cause 1.7-3.5 million 
jobs in the EU to be lost2. These calculations 
seem to significantly overestimate the poten-
tial losses that the EU economy may suffer. 
The key drawback is that they do not take into 
account the historical trends regarding an-
ti-dumping procedures which the EU has used 
towards Chinese producers over the last 15 
years. In particular, these overestimates con-
cern those sectors which the EPI has defined 
as the most risky, i.e. the clothing and textile 
industry, and the production of furniture and 
electronics, which were subject to anti-dump-
ing proceedings only occasionally3.
It should be expected that the change in the 
procedure for imposing anti-dumping tariffs 
scheduled for 11 December 2016 will mostly 
affect those sectors which have applied this 
tool so far. The repetitive nature of these cas-
es over the last 15 years and the dominance of 
2 The figures are based on the assumption that granting 
China MES will cause a 30% drop in the prices of Chinese 
products in all sectors of imports from China, which will 
dramatically boost the competitiveness of these imports, 
thereby increasing their volume and value. This is expect-
ed to cause around 800,000-1,500,000 jobs to disappear 
in the EU’s production sectors, with the textile, electronic, 
furniture and metallurgical sectors being hardest hit. Mul-
tiplier effects are then added to these figures.
3 At present, anti-dumping tariffs have been imposed on 
synthetic fibres, which belong to the category of textiles 
and account for a mere fraction of total imports from 
China in this goods category.
the chemical and metallurgical industries sug-
gest that if China is granted MES, this would 
put certain sectors at risk, which in turn would 
limit the scope of potential losses for specific 
EU economies4.
Even though the risk involved in granting China 
MES is of a sector-specific nature, it will signif-
icantly affect the situation of those sectors in 
the EU which have been covered by protective 
tariffs. According to estimates by the Europe-
an Commission, at present around 1.38% of 
imports from China are subject to anti-dump-
ing procedure; however, when the solar panel 
sector is excluded, the figure is a mere 0.68%. 
In the long term, abolition of the present rules 
for imposing anti-dumping tariffs may cause 
around 63,000 to 211,000 jobs in the 52 goods 
categories covered by this tariff to disappear5. 
The possible consequences will be borne by 
specific EU member states in different propor-
tions, depending on the geographical distribu-
tion of industry sectors at risk. According to the 
European Commission, 79% of the jobs which 
potentially are at risk of being closed down are 
in Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Portugal and 
Poland6. These states operate those EU industry 
sectors which are covered by the widest scope 
of anti-dumping tariffs, namely the metallur-
gical, ceramic and textile industries. It cannot 
be excluded that in the future Chinese com-
panies operating in new industries which the 
Chinese leadership defines as industries of key 
importance will offer excessively low prices for 
4 In 2001-2016, 103 anti-dumping procedures were carried 
out against Chinese producers (around 45% of all proceed-
ings by the European Commission), of which 80 resulted in 
additional tariffs being imposed. What is important, over 
half of the tariffs concerned the metallurgical (24 cases) 
and chemical sectors (20 cases). The remaining proceed-
ings concerned selected categories of goods including 
photovoltaic panels and glass, ceramics, bicycles, glass and 
polyester fibres, strawberries and saddles.
5 The research was conducted in February 2016. The estimat-
ed number of jobs lost has been calculated taking into ac-
count that no other protective measures have been taken 
and that certain intra-sector flows have taken place.
6 Italy – 66,200, Germany – 55,800, Spain – 27,100, France 
– 12,900, Poland – 11,000. Source: http://trade.ec.euro-
pa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154241.pdf 
A change in the method of imposing an-
ti-dumping tariffs on Chinese companies 
would reduce the competitiveness of those 
sectors of the EU economy which in previ-
ous years had taken advantage of protec-
tive instruments.
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goods sold on the EU market, resulting from 
a privileged access to resources granted by the 
government7. The significant dumping risk also 
concerns those sectors in China which at pres-
ent are struggling with excess production ca-
pacity, for example the steel production sector.
China’s stance
For years, Chinese leaders have emphasised the 
need to recognise China de iure as a market econ-
omy in their contacts with the EU. This was par-
ticularly evident during the rule of President Hu 
Jintao (2002-2012). However, after four failed ver-
ification procedures launched pursuant to EU law 
in 2004-2011, China has abandoned its attempts 
to obtain this status under a formal procedure. 
In 2011, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao presented the 
EU with a proposed political solution: MES was to 
be granted to China in exchange for China’s as-
sistance to Europe as it became affected by the 
debt crisis. Under the rule of Xi Jinping, China has 
toughened its stance, and announced in 2015 
that it would take legal action at the WTO aimed 
against members which refuse to offer equal 
treatment to Chinese exporters after December 
2016. At the same time, the Chinese media has 
maintained its narrative calling for “promises to 
be kept”, and for China’s positive role in the de-
velopment of the global economy to be acknowl-
edged by granting it MES.
7 This has happened in the past, for example in 2012 as 
regards photovoltaic panels. This resulted in duties be-
ing imposed, which in turn triggered political tension 
between the EU and China.
Over 2016, China’s official stance has evolved. 
China began to separate the issues of granting it 
de iure MES and enforcing Article 15d of China’s 
WTO accession protocol. At present, Chinese lead-
ers are expressing a ‘hard automatism’ concerning 
the heart of the matter, which involves revoking 
the methodology based on comparing Chinese 
export prices with third-country prices and treat-
ing Chinese entrepreneurs on equal terms to those 
from market economies. The Chinese leadership 
seem to be aware that in its present shape the 
Chinese economy does not meet the basic market 
economy criteria as defined by the EU. This is in-
directly confirmed by the Chinese reform agenda, 
which gives priority to reducing the excessive in-
fluence of the state on the economy. 
The change in China’s stance should be treated 
as a response to the dynamics of the debate 
within the EU. The toughest opponents of the 
idea to abolish limitations regarding Chinese 
imports have begun to challenge not only the 
automatism of granting China MES de iure, but 
also the very commitment to abolish the dis-
puted anti-dumping methodology scheduled in 
Article 15d of China’s WTO accession protocol. 
For example, this stance was included in the 
European Parliament’s resolution of May 2016, 
which China heavily criticised. The Chinese 
foreign minister Wang Yi said that abolishing 
the methodology based on third-country price 
comparison is an unconditionally valid commit-
ment by the EU contained in the treaty and re-
sulting from WTO rules. In his opinion, it is also 
fully independent of the EU’s internal standards 
regarding the granting of MES8. In his view, de 
iure granting MES would merely be a significant 
gesture intended to symbolise mutual trust and 
the fact the EU recognises China’s positive role 
in global trade9. A similar stance was adopted 
during the EU-China summit in Beijing in July 
2016; according to the European Commission 
8 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t13643 
22.shtml 
9 http: //news.x inhuanet.com/english /2016-07/20/ 
c_135527339.htm 
The Chinese tactic involves abandoning 
attempts to obtain the formal status of 
a market economy, and instead empha-
sising the real dimension of the dispute 
over the abolition of the disputed meth-
odology of imposing tariffs.
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Vice-President Jyrka Katainen, China did not 
emphasise the issue of granting it MES itself, 
and instead focused on revoking the disputed 
methodology10. 
As regards the issue of China’s production sur-
plus and its intention to sell the excess goods 
on foreign markets, which is nowadays the 
main cause of trade disputes between the EU 
and China, Beijing does not currently seem 
ready to make concessions. In its official state-
ments China’s trade ministry has deemed the 
accusations made towards China concerning 
government-induced overcapacity, for example 
in the steel market, to be false and identified 
the problems this sector faces as a consequence 
of the global supply slump11. According to the 
ministry, these issues should in no way be asso-
ciated with granting China MES12. 
Some Chinese experts seem aware of the po-
tential tensions within the EU concerning excess 
production, and have become more inclined to 
compromise. According to Shi Zhiqin, an expert 
at the Carnegie Center at Tsinghua University, in 
China the problem of excess steel production, 
which poses a threat to European producers, 
is important albeit temporary. He proposes to 
cover the sectors which are particularly threat-
ened with a temporary agreement to protect 
the EU market13. Usually, however, concessions 
which Chinese experts propose towards the 
EU relate to a more comprehensive process of 
making the Chinese economy a market econ-
omy (which is anyway the aim of the internal 
reforms), which involves increasing the access 
to the internal market of public procurement, 
protecting intellectual property and reducing 
subsidies, with no sectors specified14.
10 http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref= 
I124948 
11 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-07/18/
content_26122977.htm 
12 ht tp: //news.x inhuanet.com/for tune /2016-07/23/ 
c_129171831.htm 
13 http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/03/15/china-eu-rela-
tions-crisis-and-opportunity/iv8f 
14 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_com-
ing_battle_for_market_economy_status_7052 
The European Commission’s gambit
The EU’s official stance on granting MES to Chi-
na, as presented by the European Commission 
on 20 July 2016, reflects Europe’s intention to 
avoid open conflict with China by way of re-
constructing the instruments the EU applies to 
impose anti-dumping tariffs. At the same time, 
it satisfies the demands voiced by the main 
stakeholders within the EU who oppose the 
abolition of limitations on imports from China. 
The Commission has announced that it is clos-
ing the debate on granting MES to China by re-
moving the very term of market economy sta-
tus from EU legislation15. This is tantamount to 
eliminating the division into states which have 
MES and those which do not. China has repeat-
edly referred to this division as discriminatory. 
The new system, which Cecilia Malmström, the 
European Trade Commissioner, referred to as 
“neutral”, is intended to contain a brand new 
mechanism to protect the EU market which 
would comprise all WTO member states. The 
new anti-dumping rules are intended to guaran-
tee at least the same level of protection as the 
one offered so far, and in addition the anti-sub-
sidy tariff mechanism is to be improved. A new 
methodology will be devised, based on compari-
sons with international prices, to be used against 
those entrepreneurs who take advantage of 
state assistance. All the present protective tar-
iffs are to be maintained, and the procedures 
15 Press conference by European Commission represen-
tatives on 20 July 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/
video/player.cfm?ref=I124948 
The European metallurgical industry has 
been the strongest opponent of liberalis-
ing trade with China. However, Chinese 
leaders are not inclined to compromise 
and do not intend to limit the export of 
steel products.
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which have been launched are to be completed 
according to the old rules. The final shape of the 
new regulations needs to be approved by the 
governments of the 28 member states, includ-
ing tariff procedures liberalization’s strongest 
opponent Italy, and by the European Parliament. 
The approach proposed by the European Com-
mission is intended to remove the source of the 
symbolic conflict with China – de iure MES. At 
the same time, recognition of Article 15d and 
the announcement of ‘neutral’ methodologies 
are intended as a response to China’s demands 
to meet international legal commitments and 
its announcement regarding the legal action at 
the WTO16. However, the question of the real di-
mension of the dispute, i.e. the level of tariffs to 
be imposed on Chinese products in the future, 
remains open, and depends on the specific leg-
islative proposals which the European Commis-
sion is to present in the upcoming months. 
China’s possible response
Reactions in the Chinese media to the EU’s plan 
involving the reform of procedure for imposing 
protective tariffs suggest that the proposal put 
forward by the European Commission is being 
seen as a tactical dodge which will not lead 
to China achieving its goals. Admittedly, the 
first official press release by the Xinhua agen-
cy did contain a passage that the removal of 
the debate over MES, which is “of no particular 
16 Representatives of the European Commission did not 
specify the details of how the disputed provision will 
be interpreted after 11 December. This was criticised by 
Chinese experts.
importance”, from the China-EU agenda was 
a positive step, but the announced creation of 
a new, “non-standard” methodology for tar-
iff calculation has sparked controversy. If this 
will involve the calculation of the normal price 
based on international prices, as the announce-
ment suggests, the planned reform may involve 
a mere change of the name or the scope of the 
instrument used against China. Some experts 
highlight that the new regulations may be in-
consistent with WTO rules, which in turn may 
encourage China to take legal action against 
the EU despite the announced reform of pro-
tective instruments17.
Most publications contained an accusation 
towards the European Commission regarding 
its vague presentation of its stance towards 
the subject matter, that is, the abolition of 
the methodology of third-country price com-
parison. The publications emphasised that the 
Commission’s announced obligation to meet 
“international commitments” does not guaran-
tee that a stance favourable to China as regards 
Article 15d of the accession protocol will be 
adopted18. The EU has identified its “real com-
mitment” not as formal amendments, but as 
real and equal treatment of Chinese exporters 
according to the rules applicable to entrepre-
neurs from other WTO member states. Accord-
ing to an expert quoted by the Renmin Ribao 
daily, the proposal put forward by the European 
Commission contains several unclear passages 
regarding the future status of Chinese entre-
preneurs in the new anti-dumping procedure, 
whereas the plan to maintain the present tariff 
level would be tantamount to a continuation of 
protectionist practices19. 
The Chinese authorities’ reaction to the EU’s ac-
tions largely depends on the pace at which the 
17 h t tp: / /news . x inhuane t .com / fo r tune / 2016 - 07/ 
23/c_129171831.htm 
18 http: //world.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0723/c1002-
28579254.html 
19 http: //world.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0725/c1002-
28583427.html 
Statements by members of the Chinese 
government indicate that if the EU decides 
to maintain the status quo, this would 
likely lead to China taking legal action in 
the WTO forum.
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announced changes in the procedures for im-
posing tariffs are introduced. Chinese experts 
highlight the fact that the remaining months 
may prove insufficient to convince the Euro-
pean Parliament and the member states to ap-
prove the new regulations. In this context, the 
decision by the United Kingdom (the strongest 
supporter of free trade) to leave the EU has 
been considered a factor which will facilitate 
the Commission’s task. However, if the EU does 
not manage to reform its anti-dumping instru-
ments by December 2016 and continues to ap-
ply the methodology described in Article 15a, 
China will take legal action against the EU un-
der a WTO20 procedure. 
20 Due to the complexity of the procedures and to the im-
portance of the negotiations between the parties, the 
potential results of the arbitration may become evident 
only several years after the case has been filed. The is-
sue of the European Commission using the wrong meth-
odology to calculate the tariffs for the import of metal 
goods from China has been the subject of WTO arbitra-
tion before; in 2015, six years after filing the case, China 
won, which forced the EU to lift the tariffs.
The very process of formulating the final word-
ing of the EU regulations regarding protective 
tariffs will undoubtedly take up China’s atten-
tion in the upcoming months. Chinese diplo-
mats will most likely try to influence the EU’s 
decision-making process by lobbying EU insti-
tutions and using bilateral contacts with spe-
cific states. The stance adopted by the Chinese 
government and Chinese experts suggests 
that they are determined to gain significant 
concessions in the field of the economy. Their 
tough stance as regards limiting the volume of 
exports in those Chinese sectors which have 
a production overcapacity indicates that the 
potential for compromise in this field is limited.
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APPENDIX
Market economy status (MES)
Market economy status determines the procedure of introducing anti-dumping tariffs targeting 
exporters from World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states. In the context of WTO regulations, 
dumping involves the producer setting the prices of exported products at a level which is lower 
than that of the prices of goods sold on the domestic market. For an anti-dumping procedure to 
be carried out, a so-called normal price needs to be set. Then, the price of a product which is to be 
imported is compared with this normal price. If the price of the imported product is lower than the 
normal price, a so-called dumping margin arises, which causes a relevant anti-dumping tariff to be 
imposed on the exporter. 
In the case of states which have MES, the basis for comparison is the prices applied on their domestic 
markets. For non-market economies (NME), it is assumed that domestic prices are administratively 
regulated, which makes it impossible to use them as a credible basis for calculating the scale of 
dumping. This means that if an anti-dumping procedure is launched against an NME, then the nor-
mal price is set not on the basis of the prices used on the domestic market, but according to other 
methodologies, for example by comparing the prices with prices applied on third-country markets. 
